


# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

VOLUME 2

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

NUMBER 4



*NATO  
Enlargement:  
The American  
Viewpoint*

*October 1997*

# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

## *NATO Enlargement: The American Viewpoint*

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

USIA ELECTRONIC JOURNALS

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**“A larger, stronger NATO that includes Europe’s new democracies will be even better able to provide for Europe’s security and make America safer,” says President Clinton.**

**“It will help deter future threats, expand our collective defense capability to address traditional and non-traditional security challenges, and secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe. It is a key part of our strategy to build an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe for the first time in history.”**

**President Clinton offers these comments in response to questions posed to him by 20 U.S. senators. Their exchange leads off a series of articles in this issue of *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* that examines U.S. policy on NATO enlargement as debate on this major issue enters a crucial phase — the ratification process to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members.**

**What concerns are important to the Clinton administration, Congress, and the American public as the debate on NATO enlargement begins on Capitol Hill? What criteria are being used in shaping U.S. policy and congressional viewpoints? How has NATO evolved in the post-Cold War era, and how has it become much more than a guarantor of military security?**

**This journal takes a look at these and other questions. In addition to the perspective that the president presents, the administration’s principal spokesman on NATO enlargement offers a broad overview of U.S. policy, a former high-ranking U.S. military official addresses NATO enlargement from a military and security perspective, and the U.S. envoy to NATO assesses the organization’s current role in global affairs. Also included are comments by U.S. senators closely involved in the congressional debate on NATO enlargement, an article explaining the role of Congress in the ratification process, a survey of U.S. public opinion polls on NATO enlargement, and commentary by a private-sector analyst addressing NATO’s impact on democratic and economic institutions.**

*For continuous updates on U.S. policy related to NATO and NATO enlargement issues, please refer to the U.S. Information Service (USIS) home page entitled “The United States and the New Atlantic Community.” It can be located on the World Wide Web at the following address: “<http://www.usia.gov/topical/poll/atcomm/atlantic.htm>”.*

# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the  
U. S. Information Agency*

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## **NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE AMERICAN VIEWPOINT**

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## PROMOTING TRANS-ATLANTIC SECURITY THROUGH NATO ENLARGEMENT

*Responses by President Clinton to Questions from U.S. Senators*

*President Clinton says he supports the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic “out of the firm conviction that these states are committed to NATO’s principles, will make strong contributions to the alliance, and will enhance NATO’s collective defense capability.” The president’s comment came in a September 11 letter to 20 U.S. senators that contained his written responses to a series of questions they had submitted to him on the subject of NATO enlargement. In posing the questions, the senators said it was not their intention “to express either support for or opposition to” the enlargement of NATO, which they described as “the most successful security alliance in the history of the United States, if not the world.” Rather, they said, there is a need for “more debate and circumspection” on the issue to enable the American people to judge for themselves whether or not such a move is in their interest. Among those signing the letter were Republican Senators Jesse Helms, John Warner, Kay Bailey Hutchison, and Lauch Faircloth, and Democratic Senators Dale Bumpers, Tom Harkin, and Paul Wellstone. Following are excerpts from the senators’ questions and the president’s responses to them.*

**QUESTION:** What is the military threat that NATO expansion is designed to counter? How does expansion increase the security of Europe and the American people?

**CLINTON:** Europe’s security is a vital American interest, as we have seen through two World Wars and the Cold War. Over the past half century, NATO has been our primary shield to protect that interest. With the Cold War over, NATO remains the foundation of trans-Atlantic security. A larger, stronger NATO that includes Europe’s new democracies will be even better able to provide for Europe’s security and make America safer. It will help deter future threats, expand our collective defense capability to address traditional and non-traditional security challenges, and secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe. It is a key part of our strategy to build an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe for the first time in history.

NATO’s very existence is an important reason its current members and prospective new members face no imminent threat of attack. By adding new

members to its strength, the world’s most effective deterrent force will be even better able to prevent conflict from arising in the first place.

Enlargement will help NATO address the security challenges that do arise. It will make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member states. In addition, rogue states, the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial, and religious hatreds continue to threaten trans-Atlantic security — as we know from Bosnia. A larger, increasingly cohesive community of trans-Atlantic states able to combine their security resources will be better able to address whatever contingencies arise.

Enlargement will help guard against non-traditional security threats from outside Europe that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems. None of us can deal effectively with such threats alone. Enlargement will help broaden and intensify multinational coordination through NATO — one of our most effective instruments to counter these problems.

The alliance must be prepared for other contingencies, including the possibility that Russia could abandon democracy and return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although we see such a turn as unlikely. Through our policy of engaging Russia we seek to provide strong incentives to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with its neighbors. These efforts, combined with the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO-Russia Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of democratic and peaceful development.

Finally, enlargement will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line. For 50 years, NATO has helped prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy, and create a stable environment for prosperity. Each previous instance of enlargement — Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982 — strengthened democracy and stability within the new member states and added to the alliance countries committed to defend the trans-Atlantic community. Now, enlargement can do for Europe's East what it did for the West. Already the prospect of membership has helped consolidate democracy in Central Europe, strengthen free market reform, and encourage NATO aspirants to settle disputes with their neighbors.

**Q:** How will NATO expansion strengthen stability in Europe when the nations that face the greatest potential threats to their own security — including the Baltic states and several other nations — will not be included in the first NATO expansion?

**CLINTON:** NATO enlargement will enhance stability throughout Europe and improve the security of all Europe's democracies, not just those admitted first. This is true for a number of reasons.

— First, NATO enlargement is not a one-time event, but a process that will continue after the first round. The Madrid communique specifically notes that NATO will “maintain an open door to the admission of additional alliance members in

the future.” States that are credible candidates for future admission to the alliance will benefit from the knowledge that the alliance is attentive to their security.

— Second, NATO is taking a range of direct steps to improve the security of states that will not be initially admitted, from enhancements to the Partnership for Peace program to creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the completion of a NATO-Ukraine Charter.

— Finally, as it has in the past, NATO will continue to promote stability and cooperation beyond the borders of its members. The prospect of enlargement has already prompted major progress in resolving disputes and tensions within Central and Eastern Europe, and encouraged many of the new democracies to contribute in tangible ways to promoting long-term security, as seen by their participation in the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia.

Enlargement had to start with the strongest candidates or else it would not have started at all. The Baltic states understand that NATO enlargement, as a process which extends stability toward their own borders, increases their security even though they have not yet been invited to become alliance members. They have expressed support for our policy and have publicly endorsed the decisions taken at the Madrid Summit. Ukrainian leaders have taken a similar position, seeing the presence of prospective NATO members on their western borders as a contribution to Ukraine's long-term security.

**Q:** In the administration's February 1997 “Report to Congress on the Enlargement of NATO,” you assumed that the United States would pay only 15 percent of the direct enlargement costs, with the new members paying 35 percent of the bill, and the current (non-U.S.) members paying 50 percent. Will the new members or the current members pay these amounts? Will you make the cost-sharing agreement part of the expansion negotiations? If not, how will yours and future administrations handle shortfalls?

**CLINTON:** The cost estimates in the administration's February 1997 report to Congress relied in part on standard NATO cost-sharing arrangements. Under these procedures, each country pays the cost of maintaining its own national military. The February report assumed that countries would pay for their own direct enlargement enhancements, except for those programs that would qualify for common funding. As a result, the Department of Defense estimated that about 40 percent of direct enlargement enhancements could be nationally funded and 60 percent could be common-funded. Out of a total estimated cost of \$9-12 billion, this would mean that new members would pay for approximately 35 percent (\$3.0-4.5 billion total through 2009, or about \$230 to \$350 million per year) of direct enlargement enhancements; current (non-U.S.) members would pay about 50 percent (\$4.5-5.5 billion over the period, or around \$350 to \$425 million per year); and the United States would pay its 24 percent share of the common-funded enhancements (about 15 percent of the total direct enlargement bill, or approximately \$1.5-2.0 billion over the 2000-2009 timeframe), averaging between \$150 and \$200 million per year.

In addition to the direct costs of enlargement, individual allies will need to continue to improve their capabilities for force projection, consistent with their commitments under the alliance's new Strategic Concept adopted in 1991. Force projection capabilities will take on increased importance as NATO enlarges, in view of the allies' conclusion that the defense of new members' territory will be based primarily on reinforcement in times of danger rather than through the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Because the United States already possesses substantial force projection capabilities, the United States will not bear a significant portion of this category of costs. We will continue, through the NATO collective force planning process, to encourage our European allies to continue to develop their force projection capabilities.

Past estimates of enlargement costs, including those produced by the administration, have necessarily been notional. Now that NATO has

decided which states to invite to begin accession talks, it will be possible to assess more precisely their security needs and assets, and to define the implications for NATO's budgets. This process will begin immediately and will be tied closely to the accession process. While each of the three invited states has indicated its willingness to contribute to the NATO-funded and national costs of membership, the accession talks will help to clarify those obligations and commitments.

Enlargement will not be cost free. However, it is affordable for both current and prospective members. In light of the enormous benefits which enlargement will bring to both Europe and the United States, it represents extraordinary value for the money.

**Q:** Many of us view the principal threat confronting the 12 nations seeking NATO membership as less a military threat than a struggle for economic stability. Fierce competition exists among these 12 states. By conferring NATO membership on a few nations now, those nations will have a distinct advantage over their neighbors in the competition to attract new business and foreign investment. This type of economic competition and imbalance could well breed friction and instability in Central Europe. Will NATO be obligated to step in and resolve the very conflicts that could be caused by the NATO selection process? Would European Union membership be a better option to achieve the economic stability NATO aspirants are seeking?

**CLINTON:** Economic challenges do remain critical for Central and East European states. Most of these states need to advance and deepen aspects of reform — from privatization, to improved regulatory regimes, to efforts against corruption. This is one reason we support the enlargement of the European Union to include Central and East European states.

While the role of the EU is critical, there is no reason to insist on a choice between EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. Both are important. Both make independent contributions

to European prosperity and security. EU enlargement alone, however, is not sufficient to secure our nation's security interests in post-Cold War Europe. Unlike NATO, the EU lacks a military capability. Military capability remains the heart of NATO's strength and continues to be needed to preserve European security.

As free markets take root in Central and Eastern Europe, it is certainly reasonable to expect that economic competition among the region's states will intensify, just as it has in Western Europe and other parts of the world. There is no historical evidence, however, that would suggest NATO membership will become a meaningful distinction in economic competition within Central and Eastern Europe. NATO membership was never used over the past half century to draw foreign investment from, say, Sweden to Norway.

What matters most to firms and investors are economic fundamentals. Central and East European states will attract business through privatization, sound management of their budgets and money supply, and efforts to create a talented work force and reduce unemployment. For those European states that are economically less developed today, the right answer for them is to deepen such reforms, and the prospect of NATO membership gives them some additional incentive to do so. In addition, NATO enlargement, together with closer security cooperation through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, will help stability take root throughout Central and Eastern Europe — in member states and non-member states alike — making all of its countries more attractive to investors. Conversely, a failure of NATO to enlarge could undermine the business climate for the entire region. While firms are unlikely to invest in a country solely because it is a NATO member, they might well invest less heavily in a region such as Central and Eastern Europe if its security future were called into question.

**Q:** Do Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have the military capabilities to make a positive contribution to the security of NATO, or will they

be net consumers of security for the foreseeable future?

**CLINTON:** Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all taken significant steps to reform their militaries, upgrade their military capabilities, and contribute to European security beyond their borders. The Defense Department estimates that they can achieve a "mature capability" within about a decade after joining the alliance. The new members will be expected to contribute to the range of NATO security functions and missions.

Even today, the three states bring significant assets to NATO's security work. Together, they bring over 300,000 troops to the alliance. All three have firmly established civilian control of their militaries. Their initial defense reform efforts have focused on low-cost, high-return enhancements to interoperability to allow effective near-term security contributions. Over time, they will increase their ability to operate with NATO forces in their own countries and elsewhere.

Moreover, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have demonstrated their readiness to contribute to security beyond their borders. Both Poland and the Czech Republic contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition. Poland has been a leader in its region, helping Lithuania and Ukraine develop their armed forces and creating joint units with both countries. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic now provide over 1,500 troops to the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Hungary provides the base from which U.S. forces deploy into Bosnia. Through individual efforts and participation in numerous Partnership for Peace exercises, the three states have begun to improve their abilities to work with NATO forces.

Each of the states will need to pursue an active and sustained program of reform and modernization in order to achieve a higher level of NATO interoperability and broader military capabilities over the next decade. Leaders from all three states have stated their willingness to do so and have

demonstrated that their countries will become net security producers over time as full members of NATO.

**Q:** When one looks at the threats to American national security interests, foremost among these is Russia's substantial nuclear arsenal. Considerable progress has been made to lessen nuclear tensions through dramatic arms reductions in the past decade. And, for the moment, the current leadership in Russia is becoming reconciled to the likelihood of NATO expansion. But what of tomorrow's Russian leaders? By expanding eastward, are we not creating an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions and perhaps even develop an early first-use nuclear policy?

**CLINTON:** The objective of our trans-Atlantic security policy is an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. NATO enlargement is an important part of that strategy. So is our effort to support the development of a Russia that is democratic, prosperous, at peace with its neighbors, and cooperating with us and other states on a range of security challenges, including mutual reductions in our nuclear arsenals. So also is our effort, which bore fruit in May in the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, to institutionalize a broad and cooperative relationship between the alliance and Russia.

President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO enlargement, reflecting in part a lingering misperception among many Russian political leaders that the alliance poses a threat to Russia's security. That is an issue on which we have decided to disagree, while working together to manage that disagreement. But, judging by the evidence, it is unlikely that NATO enlargement will undermine Russian reform or strengthen Russian hardliners. Those who suggest this would be the case see Russian democracy as far more fragile than has proven the reality over the last few years. NATO enlargement is not a significant concern for most of the Russian public, which understandably remains far more concerned about wages, pensions, corruption, and other domestic issues.

Over the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, Russian reform and security cooperation have continued to advance. President Yeltsin was reelected. He brought new officials into the government who are committed to economic modernization and integration with Western and global structures. He brought in a new defense minister who supports the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty. At the Helsinki Summit in March, President Yeltsin agreed to press for Duma ratification of START II, and to pursue a START III treaty with further reductions once START II has entered into force. And of course, Russia joined with NATO in May to conclude the Founding Act. Indeed, as NATO enlargement has gone forward, Russia has drawn closer to the West.

These recent positive developments call into question the theory that NATO enlargement erodes Russian reform and security cooperation. In any case, it would be counterproductive to make our NATO policies hostage to Duma intransigence on START II. Doing so would send a message to the Duma that we will hold up NATO enlargement as long as they hold up START II. In that case, we likely would get neither.

**Q:** What have we given up in terms of NATO's own freedom of action to deploy forces throughout the expanded area of the alliance in order to obtain Russian acquiescence to the expansion plan?

**CLINTON:** The NATO-Russia Founding Act was not an effort to buy Russian acquiescence to enlargement. It was instead driven by our judgment — and that of the alliance — that a robust NATO-Russia relationship could make an important contribution toward the goal of a peaceful and undivided Europe.

The Founding Act institutionalizes this relationship and provides the basis for increased cooperation. At the same time, NATO equities remain fully protected. The North Atlantic Council remains the supreme decision-making body of the alliance. The Founding Act, in establishing a Permanent Joint Council between

NATO and Russia, provides for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, joint decision-making and action. The Founding Act is equally clear, however, that NATO retains its independence of decision-making and action at all times. The Permanent Joint Council offers Russia a forum in which to express its views and, where possible, to facilitate cooperation between NATO and Russia. But there is not now and will not be a Russian veto over NATO decisions or any restrictions on NATO's freedom of action.

If Russia adopts a constructive approach to its relationship with NATO, there is enormous potential for cooperation on a wide range of issues, from non-proliferation to humanitarian assistance. If Russia chooses not to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Founding Act, no impediment has been created. NATO retains its strength, autonomy, and ability to act.

Nothing in the Founding Act restricts NATO's ability to station troops, deploy weapons, or carry out any of its missions. The final section of the act contains restatements of unilateral NATO policy that existed prior to the Founding Act about how the alliance intends to act "in the current and foreseeable security environment." In its 1995 enlargement study, NATO concluded that enlargement did not require a change to the alliance's nuclear posture; on this basis, NATO declared in December 1996 that NATO members

"have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy." The Founding Act also restates NATO's March 1997 unilateral declaration that it "will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Moreover, none of NATO's unilateral statements regarding military policy cited in the Founding Act restricts the alliance's ability to conduct exercises, establish headquarters, or build and maintain infrastructure. Indeed, the Founding Act acknowledges that NATO will "have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with (these) tasks," given that NATO's strategy now revolves around the ability of states to receive reinforcements.

The Founding Act reflects alliance policy in the current and foreseeable security environment. Should we see an unexpected change for the worse, NATO retains the prerogative to reconsider its policies with regard to nuclear and conventional deployments, and the Founding Act would in no way constrain that. It is our hope and expectation, however, that the recent very positive trends within Europe will continue and that the Founding Act will provide a vehicle for greatly expanded cooperation between NATO and Russia. ●

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## SETTING THE FUTURE COURSE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

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*An interview with Jeremy Rosner  
Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for NATO Enlargement Ratification*

*The NATO enlargement debate, which entails both “solemn security guarantees and a significant amount of money,” is helping “to set our course on European security policy for the coming years,” Rosner notes. He is confident that when the debate is over, the U.S. Senate will vote to ratify the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Rosner was interviewed by Managing Editor Dian McDonald.*

**QUESTION:** Is NATO enlargement the most important foreign policy issue the Clinton administration must deal with in the next few months?

**ROSNER:** It’s certainly one of our highest priorities and certainly will be a major issue for Congress, given that unlike some foreign policy initiatives, it centers very distinctly around a specific vote, and one that requires a two-thirds margin.

Because of the stakes involved and the consequences involved, it will be both for the country and the U.S. Senate a very major debate and decision. In some ways, it’s the first major debate over European security policy that the country will have since the end of the Cold War. It entails both solemn security guarantees and a significant amount of money. And it really helps to set our course on European security policy for the coming years. For all those reasons, it will be quite a major decision, and I am sure will be treated that way on Capitol Hill.

**Q:** To what extent is the administration lobbying Congress on NATO enlargement, and what strategy is it using in that effort?

**ROSNER:** I don’t know if I would call it lobbying, but we certainly are using all of the resources available to make the case — both to the Congress and to the public — for why we think NATO enlargement is good for American national security. The president and Secretary Albright and

all of us who are working for them have spent a substantial amount of time and effort talking to members of Congress, engaging in hearings, preparing materials for them, including the report on this issue that the president sent to Congress in February and the letter that he sent September 11 to 20 senators, answering a wide range of core questions about NATO enlargement. We are also talking with the public, going all over the country to forums on these kinds of issues, talking with groups who are interested in NATO enlargement — ranging from the veterans’ community to the religious community to the business community to ethnic communities. Because of the level of consequence, it clearly requires a great deal of discussion, both on Capitol Hill and outside of Washington.

And we’ve done everything possible to stimulate that debate as early as possible. And I think the fact that the president and the secretary established this office (NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, U.S. Department of State) — and it’s dedicated to just those functions — is a sign that they wanted more debate on this and not less — and an earlier debate, rather than simply attention at the last minute.

**Q:** What do you think will be the effect of the September 17 letter to Secretary Albright from Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in which he discussed NATO enlargement and outlined plans for committee hearings on the issue?

**ROSNER:** We certainly welcome the letter and the statement by the chairman that he wants to help ratification succeed. We understand that he still has some concerns about this, and we hope that the congressional hearings can help address his concerns and those of his colleagues. We have encouraged and welcomed hearings on NATO enlargement from very early on. Both Secretary Albright and Defense Secretary Cohen testified last April before the Senate Armed Services Committee. We have engaged quite energetically with other congressional forums on this, including hearings and meetings in the House, and with the Senate NATO Observer Group that the two leaders in the Senate established. We have met with that group on a regular basis, everyone from the president, the vice president, and the secretary on down. Our view is that the more this issue is aired, the more support there will be and the more comfortable Congress will feel about it. And we certainly hope to have the chairman's support on NATO enlargement. We would welcome his support and are encouraged by the statement he made in his letter.

**Q:** In the foreign affairs arena, is your office engaged in any specific multilateral or bilateral activities right now related to NATO enlargement?

**ROSNER:** We certainly do take close note of the ratification efforts abroad and of the way this is being debated abroad, in part because to a very noticeable degree the reaction to this issue overseas is having a major impact on the debate here in the United States, and especially in the Congress. So we stay very closely abreast of the political debates and the press debates overseas on this. We meet with many foreign officials who are interested in our ratification effort so that we can get better insights into their ratification effort. And I, along with other people in my office, have spoken overseas about what we are doing to try to make sure there is a good understanding abroad of our ratification effort and the concerns that the American public and the American Congress have about this issue.

**Q:** What risks are inherent in the alternative to enlarging NATO — that is, maintaining NATO at its Cold War membership?

**ROSNER:** I think there are a number of risks. And as people — both in Congress and outside Congress — focus on the question of the costs of this initiative, which they should, they also should focus on the costs of not moving ahead. As the president suggested on that very question in his report to Congress in February, there are many costs connected with that. First, it would risk leaving the security status of Central Europe undefined and risk making that region less secure. And we should recall that in this century two world wars and a cold war have had their roots, in part, in that region and its insecurity and instability at various points. And so it would be a historic mistake to miss the opportunity to enhance the security and stability and definition of that region because that is probably the best thing we can do to avoid being drawn back into war in Europe, as we have been in this century.

Second, if we fail to enlarge NATO, we would fail to strengthen the alliance. The three countries that will come in will bring some 300,000 troops and other security resources. They have already demonstrated their determination to contribute to security beyond their borders by their efforts in the Gulf War and in Bosnia. And we would lose the opportunity to have three states that are willing, able, and really eager to help us address Europe's new security challenges.

And, third, I think if NATO were not enlarging, we would not be seeing some of the very positive trends in that region. We have seen nearly a dozen agreements reached among the states in the region to settle their border and ethnic disputes; partly that is because states in the region know that to be credible applicants for NATO membership they must take such steps. And it's doubtful whether these trends toward stability and a deepening of democracy would be taking place to the extent they are in the region if this were not going forward.

And finally, I think there is a cost in terms of what it would imply about our view of Europe and its divisions. If we failed to enlarge NATO, we would in effect be making permanent the dividing line in

Europe that Stalin imposed and maintained by force through the Cold War. And that dividing line is certainly outdated at this point and illegitimate. And so if we seek to erase the dividing line in Europe and help build a Europe that is undivided and democratic and at peace, then we certainly must start by taking in qualified members in Central Europe and embracing a process that will take in more in the future.

**Q:** Do you believe that the widely varying cost estimates for NATO enlargement reported by the media could be a deciding factor in the outcome of the debate over the issue?

**ROSNER:** Congress certainly will look very closely at the costs of NATO enlargement. They have already indicated that they are very concerned about this. And they should pay a great deal of attention to it at a time when we are working to balance the budget. But I think now that we know which countries are coming into NATO, and now that NATO is formulating its own estimates of the resource implications, members of Congress over the coming months will be able to gain more certainty about the policy and understand what the resource implications are. And I expect that as all that becomes clear, they will have a firmer basis for making the core decision about whether the benefits do justify the costs. We view this as a relatively modest investment with an extremely high payoff. We have estimated the U.S. share of the cost to be between \$150 million to \$200 million a year over the next decade. And compared to the billions we spent on World War Two, and the trillions we spent on the Cold War, it seems that if this can buy us future decades of security and stability in Central Europe and the rest of Europe, then it is an excellent investment.

**Q:** How would you characterize the significance of the Madrid Summit actions for European security and also in terms of the restructuring and future of NATO as an organization?

**ROSNER:** The Madrid Summit was quite historic. The alliance made the decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin the

process of entering the alliance. Certainly that was the most significant decision since the end of the Cold War in many ways. And, further, it declared that the door would remain open to the addition of other members in the future. And it noted in particular the progress of Romania and Slovenia and noted the aspirations of the Baltics to join as well.

In addition, the Madrid Summit continued to move ahead with the process of NATO's adaptation, its improvements, the streamlining of its command structures, its efforts to increase its abilities in many ways through, for example, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the enhancements in Partnership for Peace, the charter with Ukraine, and the Founding Act with Russia. Taken together, this is a dramatic set of initiatives that firmly orient NATO toward Europe's new security challenges and toward the goal that we have spoken of — a Europe that really is undivided, democratic, and at peace for perhaps the first time in its history.

**Q:** How does NATO enlargement affect U.S. relations with non-NATO countries other than those that are being considered for future membership?

**ROSNER:** When you look at the full range of initiatives that are being launched during this period — not just the addition of the three countries, but also the open door policy, the new accords with Russia and Ukraine, the enhancements of Partnership for Peace, as well as our own bilateral efforts with the states in the region — I think it's clear why so many of the states in the region that were not invited to begin the process of joining at Madrid nonetheless have expressed their strong support for the decisions at Madrid and have said that even though they have not now been invited to join, they view the decisions made at Madrid as something that will improve their security as well.

One example that underscored this was the tremendous reception that the president and secretary received in Bucharest, Romania, a couple

of days after the Madrid Summit. There were over 100,000 people filling the streets to applaud the president and the decisions of Madrid, even though Romania had expressed a keen interest in being invited into NATO but was not. And there were strong statements by President Constantinescu of appreciation for the process that NATO had begun. So, I think we have a good deal of evidence that this overall set of initiatives is something that the region as a whole has welcomed, and that is helping to improve security and stability in the region.

**Q:** How do you foresee the next steps for NATO enlargement if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are granted membership?

**ROSNER:** NATO has declared that it will review the open door process in 1999, that it will keep an open door for considering the membership aspirations of other applicant states, and will continue to work with them through the Partnership for Peace program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. I think after the first states are ratified — which I am confident will happen by 1999 — people will want to see how that process went. But I think they will turn their attention both to the integration of those three states in an orderly way and to considerations about the next states that continue to have aspirations for membership.

**Q:** What is the key challenge for the administration now in terms of NATO enlargement?

**ROSNER:** Right now we're in the middle of accession talks with the three states. We need to complete those. We need to complete the study with our NATO allies of the resource implications of this, and then move to lay this before the Senate for its ratification. I expect the Senate will look very hard at what this means for American taxpayers, for our relations with Russia, for the states not initially invited in, for NATO's effectiveness; the Senate as well will consider its relationship to decisions and operations in Bosnia. But after the Congress looks at those issues, I am confident that after a rigorous debate it will vote to ratify the admission of these three states. We will then have to move to ratification by all of the other allied states. It must be done unanimously.

And then I think the challenge will be to show that this is a plus for the alliance and a plus for Europe and a plus for America's own security. And the process of bringing the states into the alliance is the best way to prove that. Although that process will take some years, I think ultimately it is their entrance into the alliance itself that will give people confidence that this has been good for us, good for our allies, and good for the alliance. ©

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## ENLARGING NATO: RECKLESS OR REQUISITE?

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*By U.S. Ambassador Robert Hunter*

*In the process of NATO enlargement, “we seek to demonstrate that NATO poses no threat to anyone, but rather provides a legitimate role for all who will work with us,” says Ambassador Robert Hunter, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council. Enlarging NATO, he contends, is “a requisite part of achieving a lasting security in Europe.” The following article was adapted from an address by Hunter to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in September.*

What an extraordinary time at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Only a few short years ago, NATO’s obituary was being written; it was being consigned, along with the Warsaw Pact, to Karl Marx’s “ash heap of history.” But today, I’m pleased to report, the NATO alliance is “alive and well” and living in the strong support of 16 allies, three countries that we have invited to join, and 24 other Partners for Peace.

NATO is alive and well because it has shown itself — once again — to be the indispensable institution in meeting the needs and seizing the opportunities of security in Europe, not just for today, but into the new century.

All 16 allies have concluded that they want to do their security together, not apart, even though the original reasons for their coming together, the Cold War and the Soviet Union, have both ceased to exist. No one wants to “renationalize” defense; all want to continue this tried and true NATO compact.

NATO also continues to underpin one of history’s unique achievements: the fact that the 15 members of the European Union have done nothing less than abolish war as an instrument of their relations with one another. It is now unthinkable that Germany and its neighbors could again go to war, and no one doubts the wisdom of preserving and extending this “European Civil Space” as far as possible in both time and terrain.

We at NATO now have the opportunity and the ambition to extend that Civil Space eastward, one step at a time, to embrace societies that until now have been unable to think of a future that does not include recurring conflict. The alliance has thus reached out beyond its old borders — yes, in that sense, we have already “enlarged” — holding out the prospect, the promise, of building security across the Continent that, this time, can both endure and embrace all the countries and peoples of Europe who are ready and willing to take part.

We have also recognized that peace and security in Europe require a revolutionary approach to Russia — the country whose fate may prove to be most decisive for Europe’s future: not treating it like a pariah state that has lost a war — like the Germany after 1918 — but rather as a great nation with a legitimate right to be part of Europe, its politics, society, economics, and security — like the Germany after 1945 which developed into the free and democratic Federal Republic we know today.

At the same time, NATO has stepped up to the challenge of the most serious and sustained fighting in Europe since World War II, in Bosnia — building a bridge from the Sarajevo of 1914 to the Sarajevo of 1997.

And NATO is proving, once again, that it is critical to the United States in the world. We have long since become a European power, as a proper reflection of our strategic, political, and economic

interests — and also of our democratic values and sense of purpose.

On this, I believe, we Americans do not divide, and our continuing commitment to NATO is a premier expression of those enduring interests and values. I am gratified that every member of Congress who has visited NATO while I have been there, from both political parties, has expressed his or her support for continued U.S. engagement in European security. At the same time, on the Continent, that engagement has once again been recognized as essential. Once again, the allies look to us for inspiration, leadership, and commitment.

This is a sobering thought. It is a mark of the responsibilities that this generation of Americans is again being asked to assume, a mark of the deep deliberations and critical decisions that, together, we Americans have to make. Ultimately, our role in European security will be decided by the American people. This is right, proper — and necessary — because any commitment we make of this magnitude must sink its roots deep in our political culture.

NATO enlargement: reckless or requisite? This is not a rhetorical question, nor one that we can in any way take lightly. Let us face it: What we are now being asked to do — to take Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO — will irrevocably bind the United States to European security. It will impose new demands and, yes, some added costs. It will entail an enduring commitment to the security and stability of Central Europe. It will mean taking seriously the concerns of Russia and trying to answer them. And it will require the NATO allies, together, to make certain that all this comes out right, so that every country in the trans-Atlantic space — from North America across Eurasia — will at least in some degree have a stake in allied success. In time, we want those who stand in Chicago, in Frankfurt, in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest, in Bucharest and the Baltic States — and, yes, in Kiev and Moscow — all to be able to say that what NATO has done has made their futures more secure.

And look at the opportunity if we do get it right. We now have the chance to reach out to hundreds of millions of people who for so long languished under communist tyranny and Soviet domination — cut off from the full flowering of Western democracy and the stunning economic progress of recent decades. We have the chance to help heal breaches created in not one but in all three great European wars of this century. We are offered nothing less than a unique chance to take a second bite of history's apple: to complete the work of the Marshall Plan, helping to build democratic, prosperous, and secure societies across Europe — this time not cut off by an Iron Curtain.

NATO has thus set about to recreate itself. To this end, this spring allied leaders engaged in a stunning series of activities over a remarkable 44-day period — from the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris, to a meeting of 43 heads of state and government at the historic NATO summit in Madrid. And when the work was done, NATO had changed more fundamentally than at any moment since it was founded, nearly half a century ago.

This was in direct response to President Clinton's leadership and built on decisions taken at the Brussels Summit in 1994. NATO acted in eight different areas, each reinforcing the others, and all together providing a coherent and consistent framework for European security.

At Madrid in July, the 16 NATO heads of state and government agreed to ask the first three countries to join the alliance — choosing those judged most ready to meet the responsibilities of membership and most likely to pass muster in 16 parliaments. We are now negotiating with them acts of accession; these will go to parliaments in the new year, and if they are ratified — and that includes a two-thirds vote in the United States Senate — these first new members will join the alliance at a summit in Washington on NATO's 50th birthday in April 1999.

At the same time, at Madrid the allies agreed to keep open the door to membership. The two

actions are linked — membership and open door; the design is to erase lines of division in Europe, not to draw new ones. From the U.S. point of view, the door to NATO membership will remain open so long as there are European countries ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership. Who will be next and when that will happen has not been decided. But the commitment is clear.

But the leaders did not stop there. Three years ago, NATO launched one of its most successful ventures: the Partnership for Peace. This has brought within the compass of NATO effort and activity some 27 countries, from Central Europe through Ukraine and Russia into Central Asia. For those few countries seeking to join NATO, PFP, as we call it, is the way station to membership, the training ground for the alliance, the transition that takes place before joining rather than afterwards — so that when the United States Senate asks whether they are ready, the answer will be yes. And for those countries that do not join NATO, at least not at first, PFP offers them a permanent engagement with us, doing virtually everything that an ally can do. In fact, 14 of these partners now serve with the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, doing their part to maintain peace there, like any member of NATO.

At the same time, NATO has given greater political meaning to the Partnership for Peace by creating a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council that enables its 43 members to help direct the course of PFP and to bring their security concerns to the heart of the alliance.

But perhaps most remarkable is the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This offers to Russia a chance to play a full part in European security — if, like everyone else, it will play by the rules. The Founding Act fully protects NATO's ability to take its own decisions and to preserve its core qualities as a defense alliance; but it also provides for a wide range of consultation, cooperation, and, yes, even common action with Russia. In September the new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council met in ministerial session in New York, beginning to

sketch out a work program which, if there is goodwill and good effort on both sides, can develop into a strategic partnership that benefits both parties while fully protecting the interests of everyone else. It is still hard to imagine that, today, 1,300 Russian soldiers are serving in Bosnia as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force — American and Russian soldiers patrolling together, reinforcing one another, for the first time since the Grand Alliance dissolved after World War II.

So, too, NATO has crafted a special partnership with Ukraine, through a charter that recognizes that country's vital importance in the heartland of Europe — a critical test of all that we are trying to achieve.

The new NATO is also changing profoundly the way it works, in order to meet the very different military requirements of the new century. We will reduce the number of headquarters by two-thirds; we are creating new means of organizing and commanding forces for peacekeeping and other crises; but we will also ensure that the alliance can continue to meet any potential military challenge — and that a larger NATO is just as strong and effective as it is today.

Finally, at NATO we have responded to the desire of our European allies to take more responsibility for defense, a larger share of the burden, through a new European Security and Defense Identity. For the first time, the Western European Union will be able to undertake military operations on its own, drawing on the assistance of NATO, while reinforcing rather than competing with ties across the Atlantic.

This is the background against which I believe we should judge the enlargement of NATO — one step in an overall structure of security that can endure because it meets legitimate needs of all countries engaged in Europe.

With formal membership in the alliance, we seek nothing less than to take countries in Central Europe out of history, the history of a century in which uncertainty and instability have repeatedly

led them — and so many others — to suffer conflict and tragedy. We seek to end the competitions for primacy and control in this region — so that these long-time objects of power politics can be the subjects — and the masters — of their own destinies. We seek to give these peoples the underlying confidence to pursue, without interference, their efforts to rejoin the West, to strengthen their new democracies, to build market economies, to fashion new lives for themselves and their families. And, in the process, we seek to demonstrate that NATO poses no threat to anyone, but rather provides a legitimate role for all who will work with us.

NATO enlargement, we believe, is thus a requisite part of achieving a lasting security in Europe.

But is it also reckless? That would be true if we fail in what we are now trying to do in its many interlocking aspects; if we fail in any allied country

to ratify the acts of accession; if we fail to provide the resources — the modest resources — needed to keep NATO strong; or if we fail to realize the vision that, at heart, guides what we are now seeking to do: to create a lasting security in Europe for the 21st Century that can help redeem the terrible history of the 20th. That would indeed be failure; that would indeed be reckless.

But I am confident that we will succeed — in particular, that the people of America will join in completing the work started a half century ago with the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO. In this effort, all of us here are, in fact, engaged; we are all challenged like those courageous and visionary leaders a half century ago. Isaac Newton once said that he “stood on the shoulders of giants.” And so do we. And I am confident that, when history likewise judges us a half century from now, we will be found to have passed the test. ●

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## BRINGING NEW RESOURCES, VIGOR TO THE NATO ALLIANCE

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*An interview with Retired U.S. Army General George Joulwan*

*Joulwan says bringing new active members into NATO from the strategically relevant area of Central and Eastern Europe will enhance the security of the United States and the alliance. The retired Army general — who until July was NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) — believes that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic “will bring a fresh spirit and a vigor to re-energize the alliance as it gets ready to enter the 21st century.” Joulwan was interviewed by Contributing Editor Jacqui Porth.*

**QUESTION:** Why do you believe that NATO is, as you have said, “the most successful military alliance in history?”

**JOULWAN:** For many reasons. First of all, NATO proved its worth both as a political and a military organization for what it did in its first 40 years, which helped bring about the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, the reunification of Germany, and the demise of communism in Europe.

Since 1989, the alliance has adapted itself to the realities that we face in Europe today. The primary reality there is instability. And NATO is adapting in a way that I think demonstrates its flexibility and relevance to the 21st century. Nowhere is that more obvious than in Bosnia. The alliance, through a series of summits, has taken on new missions, has conducted both internal and external adaptation, and, for the first time in its history, has committed forces to Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement and bring stability to this very volatile part of Europe.

**Q:** Can you talk a little bit about the internal adaptations?

**JOULWAN:** The internal adaptation of the alliance is most evident, I think, in our military structure where Allied Command Europe, for example, has reduced from four regions to three. It has reduced 25 percent of its manpower. And it has streamlined its command and force structure.

We have also incorporated the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) into our operations at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). For example, the four star chief-of-staff to the Supreme Allied Commander was always an American. It is now a German four star general. The head of the combined and joint planning staff is a three star Dutch officer. The head of the Partnership Coordination Cell is a two star Danish officer. So the European officers are playing more and more of a role in the command structure of the alliance. And that internal adaptation of the alliance will continue.

We are also looking at the concept of a Combined Joint Task Force, where we would put command-and-control headquarters together that could function either under NATO or non-NATO (auspices) — for example the WEU, the Western European Union — for an operation that would be primarily European. This adaptation is extremely significant as NATO adapts to the realities of today and tomorrow.

**Q:** How is external adaptation proceeding, then?

**JOULWAN:** There are two main issues. One is the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which grew out of the January 1994 heads-of-state summit. This was an attempt by the alliance to reach out to former adversaries and non-aligned states and see if we could work together to develop common standards and procedures and doctrine, in order to conduct missions together in the future. No one knew then

that the theory would be put into practice in Bosnia, but this military cooperation program was high on my list of priorities. And it has been extremely successful: 27 nations now compose the Partnership for Peace Program; 25 of the 27 nations have liaison officers at SHAPE headquarters at Mons, Belgium. This makes SHAPE the largest multinational headquarters in the world. NATO and our partners conduct 15 major exercises together and are involved as well in hundreds of seminars, working groups, and other types of contacts. We are going from a period of confrontation in the Cold War to an era, now, of cooperation and dialogue. And it's working.

The other external adaptation is what we are doing with the Russians; this was one of the highlights of my four years as SACEUR. We have had a Russian deputy to SACEUR for Russian forces in Bosnia since October 1995. As a result of this arrangement, Russian forces are operating side-by-side with American and NATO forces in Bosnia, patrolling the strategic Posovina Corridor and interacting daily with one another in communications, logistics, and tactical training. As a result of this cooperation, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in Paris last May and offers great hope for the future.

**Q:** What military adaptations or changes must the alliance make to embrace enlargement beyond what you have described?

**JOULWAN:** Fundamentally, what must occur is that, as soon as possible, those nations accepted for membership must be brought into the NATO integrated air-defense structure. That, to me, is a top priority. Also, communications must be established and training intensified, in order to quickly bring the new member nations up to NATO standards.

**Q:** How will new NATO members enhance U.S. security requirements?

**JOULWAN:** I believe the proposed new members, the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Czechs, are located in a strategic part of Europe. It is a vacuum

that has existed between Germany and Russia for centuries, and for centuries wars have been fought in this region: two world wars in this century, alone, costing millions and millions of lives and trillions of dollars in damage. So bringing these nations into the alliance enhances not only U.S. security, but also NATO security.

In addition, these countries have militaries that in time will provide a valuable resource for the alliance, and they have demonstrated that they are willing not only to share our values and ideals within the alliance, but also to share the risks by providing forces to Bosnia. Moreover, I believe that these nations will bring a fresh spirit and a vigor to re-energize the alliance as it gets ready to enter the 21st century.

**Q:** Is NATO enlargement a military necessity?

**JOULWAN:** I think so. I believe that bringing this strategically relevant part of Europe into the alliance will promote stability and enhance the opportunity for investment in Eastern and Central Europe. By so doing, we also will make progress toward democracy. After all, George Marshall's vision of 50 years ago included not only Western Europe, but Eastern Europe and, at that time, the Soviet Union as well. So this is much in line with Marshall's dream a half century ago. Indeed, in my opinion, stability in Central Europe provides security for Russia's western flank.

**Q:** You touched on this briefly, but could you further define the military implications of NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic?

**JOULWAN:** I believe that this will enhance the security of the three nations, obviously, but in speaking to the political and military leadership of all three nations, they indicated to me that they also intend to contribute a great deal to the alliance, both politically and diplomatically, as well as militarily. After extensive discussions with the leadership of these nations, I am convinced that they are going to be full, active, and contributing members.

**Q:** Critics of NATO enlargement have suggested that adding new members could fatally dilute the nature of the alliance. What is your view?

**JOULWAN:** That is a point that needs to be debated over the next year or two. But the alliance expanded in 1951. We had 12 nations when General Eisenhower was the first Supreme Commander. We expanded over the next 30 years to 16 nations. So there has been expansion in the past. I believe there are very solid strategic reasons to include those nations that were agreed upon at Madrid (in July): Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. An additional 12 nations have applied for membership, and so the alliance and the sovereign nations involved need to continue the dialogue and then the political decision must be made on how much further the expansion should be.

**Q:** Is NATO enlargement needed to solidify the Atlantic Community relationship?

**JOULWAN:** I believe that enlargement is a follow-on to the events that occurred in 1989 and 1990. We cannot deny membership to those nations that have sacrificed a great deal over the past 40 to 50 years in their search for freedom and that also can contribute a great deal to the future security of Europe.

**Q:** Do you think the NATO members will be able — individually and collectively — to address the defense burdensharing issue sufficiently to satisfy members of the U.S. Congress who may be opposed to NATO enlargement?

**JOULWAN:** I think that cost is an issue that must be addressed. Personally, in my conversations with the political as well as the military leadership of all three nations, they have said that they intend to pay their fair share of NATO enlargement. As I said, from my vantage point, when I was Supreme Commander, I made it very clear that the requirements, as I saw them, included integrated air-defense, communications, and training. What planes or ships or tanks a nation buys is up to that nation itself.

We don't have total interoperability within the alliance now, among the 16 nations. Not everyone has the same tank; not everyone has the same fighter plane. But we have agreed on common principles and standards and procedures. And these nations that we are talking about are demonstrating that they understand those procedures in Bosnia today.

And so the costs need to be addressed, but I really believe that they have been overestimated by certain reports. Also, I don't know how you can put a price tag on the risk you run by having a conflict of some sort, or even war. So I think that the costs that we're talking about are manageable.

**Q:** Are there any other military changes or adaptations the alliance needs to make to embrace enlargement, other than the internal and external ones that you mentioned?

**JOULWAN:** No, I believe that the structure has adapted. We have an Atlantic Partnership Council now that includes all the (PFP) partners. So as they come in as new members, I believe the political structure can accommodate them. Now they may have to expand the table and they may have to expand the building, but I believe in my own discussions and interactions with these three nations that they will be very contributing nations to the alliance, and to what the alliance stands for. I was very impressed that these nations understand the values and ideals of the alliance that we have known for so many years, and, indeed, in many respects, they remind us of what the alliance is truly all about.

**Q:** The U.S. Senate debate on NATO enlargement is coming very closely timed to the debate on withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Bosnia. Do you have any concerns, or do you anticipate any problems, with the possibility of the two being linked?

**JOULWAN:** Politically, I think it's going to be an issue. I would hope that the issues related to Bosnia can be resolved before June of 1998. But these are political decisions that need to be made.

The Stabilization Force, or SFOR, is there for 18 months because that was a political decision by the alliance of which the United States is a key member. If the United States or international community wants the date changed then the alliance needs to say what the new mission is and clearly lay it out. I think the sooner that's done the better. Or, we withdraw the force in June of 1998. That decision should be made politically, and very soon — I would say no later than December.

But the issue of enlargement is a strategic issue as well, and I would hope that it would be debated on its own merit because these are decisions that will affect the future security of the United States well into the 21st century. And we need to get it right. And it needs to have the unified support of the American people, the Congress, and the North Atlantic alliance. ●

## CONGRESS AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

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*By Stanley R. Sloan  
Senior Specialist in International Security Policy  
Congressional Research Service*

*The debate over NATO enlargement “may be one of the key elements shaping U.S. foreign policy for many years to come,” says Sloan. In the following article he describes a possible scenario for the NATO enlargement ratification process in the U.S. Congress. Sloan is the senior specialist in international security policy in the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. He is currently serving as adviser to the Senate NATO Observer Group and as rapporteur for a special North Atlantic Assembly project on “NATO in the 21st Century.”*

The congressional debate on NATO enlargement has begun. It opened formally when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held its initial hearing with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on October 7. But congressional consideration of enlargement has actually been underway for several years.

The Congress has already passed several pieces of legislation supporting the enlargement process. The most recent is the European Security Act of 1997, which endorses enlargement and calls for a continuing enlargement process. Legislation in previous years, passed by simple majorities in the House and the Senate, has also supported NATO enlargement and authorized funds to facilitate the participation of potential candidates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Now, however, the question comes down to whether or not the constitutionally required two-thirds of the Senate will give its “advice and consent” to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to accept the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the trans-Atlantic alliance.

### **THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE SENATE**

Both the House and the Senate are playing important roles in this decision-making process. Under the U.S. Constitution, spending bills must

originate in the House of Representatives. Therefore the House must approve any U.S. appropriations that are required to support the enlargement decision.

But the Senate plays the critical role at the outset of the process. For the ratification process to conclude successfully, two-thirds of the members of the Senate “present and voting” must vote in the affirmative when the proposal to enlarge NATO is considered on the floor of the Senate.

The North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the “Treaty of Washington,” has always been of particular interest to the Senate. When the trans-Atlantic bargain was struck in 1949, the Senate ensured that it would be a full partner on the U.S. side of the bargain. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s report on the treaty insisted that, should new members be invited to accede to the pact, the Senate would consider it “an obligation binding upon the presidential office” to seek the Senate’s advice and consent to each accession. U.S. presidents have honored this practice ever since.

Before the proposed treaty amendment makes it to floor debate, it must jump other hurdles. It may be too early to predict with confidence exactly how NATO enlargement ratification will proceed, but what follows is a possible scenario.

## THE PROCESS

In December 1997, the NATO allies are scheduled to approve the outcome of the ongoing accession negotiations with the three candidate countries. The results of these negotiations will be in the form of three draft protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty, or one protocol, if it is decided to bind the accession of all three in one legal package. (When Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952 there was one accession protocol, not two.) In January 1998, President Clinton will likely submit the protocol[s] to the Senate.

The protocol[s] will then be referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which has the responsibility for considering the proposal and reporting it out to the full Senate. A majority of this committee's members must vote in favor of reporting the protocol[s] with a "resolution of ratification." The Foreign Relations Committee will hold hearings on the matter and will consider possible conditions and reservations to be attached to the resolution. In addition, other committees of the Senate can hold hearings and issue reports. The Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by Senator Strom Thurmond (Republican — South Carolina), will likely play an important part in helping shape the Senate debate. But it is the Foreign Relations Committee that sends the treaty amendment to the floor.

In fact, the Senate's consideration of enlargement will be well in train by the time the president sends the protocol[s] to the Hill. Already in March 1997, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (Republican — Mississippi) appointed a "Senate NATO Observer Group" to monitor the enlargement process. The group includes 20 members and 8 additional ex-officio members from the leadership of both parties. It is chaired by Senator William V. Roth, Jr. (Republican — Delaware) and co-chaired by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Democrat — Delaware). Since its formation, this group has held numerous off-the-record meetings with administration officials, NATO civilian and military leaders, and officials representing the candidate states. Such meetings have served as a

channel for information to the Senate about the enlargement process and as a forum for informal debate and discussion of enlargement issues.

This thorough process of review now becomes more formal with the Foreign Relations Committee's public hearings on enlargement that will continue into November. These hearings will focus on the major enlargement issues, including the strategic rationale for enlargement, cost and burdensharing questions, qualifications of the applicant states, and implications for relations with Russia. Senator Jesse Helms (Republican — North Carolina) chairs the committee and will determine the manner in which it handles the resolution. Other key roles will be played by Senator Gordon Smith (Republican — Oregon), who chairs the Subcommittee on European Affairs, and Senator Biden, the top-ranking Democratic member of both the committee and the subcommittee. Senator Richard G. Lugar (Republican — Indiana) and other members of the committee will likely play influential roles in the debate.

In January 1998, discussion in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will begin to focus on what conditions or reservations senators wish to attach to the resolution of ratification. Presuming that the committee reaches agreement on a resolution favoring ratification, it will send that resolution to the floor of the Senate. During debate on the floor, senators may offer additional conditions or reservations, each of which will require a simple majority for inclusion. Then, after what is likely to be an extensive debate, two-thirds of the senators present and voting (67 if all 100 senators are present) will have to vote in the affirmative to send the protocol[s] on to the president, who completes the ratification process for the United States.

Senator Lott has said that he would like the Senate to complete its work by April 1998, one year before the goal set by the Clinton administration for holding a NATO summit meeting in Washington to welcome the three new members on the 50th anniversary of NATO's founding.

## **ISSUES IN THE DEBATE**

The debate in the Senate, and more broadly in the U.S. Congress, will be about much more than who should join NATO. The Senate's consideration of the protocol[s] will likely become a debate about the respective roles of the United States and its European allies in the post-Cold War world. This is not likely to be a partisan debate. There are proponents and skeptics in both political parties.

Arguments in the committees and on the floor of the Senate will scrutinize the purpose of NATO and the appropriate balance of burdens and responsibilities in the alliance. Whether or not the necessary two-thirds vote will be cast in favor of enlargement may depend as much on the perception of the state of trans-Atlantic cooperation as on the qualifications of the anxious candidate states.

Most Capitol Hill NATO insiders believe that the toughest issue in the fight over NATO enlargement will be an old familiar one: burdensharing. The end of the Cold War brought a temporary respite to the endemic burdensharing debate in the Congress. Since the Berlin Wall fell, the issue has simply not garnered the same attention that it achieved during the Cold War. Now, however, a convergence of enlargement and Bosnia-related expenses could bring the issue back with renewed vigor.

Senator Roth, a strong supporter of enlargement who currently serves as the president of the North Atlantic Assembly, NATO's parliamentary body, has cautioned: "How the costs of NATO expansion will be shared will be critically important in the ratification debates, particularly in the U.S. Senate." Senator Biden, also a supporter of both NATO and enlargement, has warned that "for NATO to remain a vibrant organization...the non-U.S. members must assume their fair share of direct enlargement costs." And, according to Senator Biden, they must also develop their own force power-projection capabilities.

The burdensharing issue is likely to focus on several aspects: direct costs of NATO enlargement, force improvements required for adaptation to new

missions, and arrangements for continued implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia. In addition, many members of Congress believe that the main responsibility for bringing the new democracies into the Western fold belongs to the European Union. They would like to see an EU enlargement process that appears likely to bring qualified East and Central European states into the EU fold as soon as possible.

## **COSTS OF ENLARGEMENT**

With regard to the direct costs of NATO enlargement, the Clinton administration, in its February 1996 report to the Congress, projected the total cost of an initial "small" group (similar to the one approved at Madrid) at \$27-35 billion between 1997 and 2009. Of this total, a projected \$9-12 billion are called "direct enlargement" costs: those improvements in command, control, and communications facilities to link the new allies to the current members. Such costs would be shared according to traditional NATO cost-sharing formulas, under which, for example, the U.S. share would be some \$150-200 million per year. Members of Congress will expect NATO allies to carry their "fair share" of such relatively modest expenses without complaint. NATO will undoubtedly agree on a cost-sharing formula, but most European allies believe the United States has overestimated the necessary costs. The official NATO cost estimate will likely be under the U.S. numbers.

The study projected another \$10-13 billion in costs to the new members to restructure their own forces to make them more interoperable with NATO forces for both collective defense and peace operations. Many analysts and the applicants themselves see this portion of the costs as expenses that the new members would incur in any case to modernize their military capabilities over the next decade.

## **COST OF FORCE PROJECTION IMPROVEMENTS**

The most controversial and difficult issue posed by the Clinton administration's costs estimates, and

one on which senators are quite likely to focus, is the cost of improvements to the military capabilities of current allies. These costs, estimated in the U.S. study at some \$8-10 billion, are not a new product of the enlargement decision. Rather, these costs are seen as resulting from NATO's 1991 New Strategic Concept's requirement for all allies to restructure their forces to make them more capable of projecting force beyond national borders. The United States has judged the improvements not only essential to support NATO's new missions but also to fulfill collective defense commitments to the new allies. Many allies already are moving in this direction. But none of them is likely to have "new" money available for developing force projection capabilities. They are trying to meet the Strategic Concept's goals by developing greater efficiencies and re-prioritizing current expenditures.

At the very least, the Senate's resolution of ratification seems likely to include some provisions calling for allied efforts both to underwrite the direct costs of enlargement and to meet their commitments to develop greater force projection capabilities.

#### **BOSNIA**

One of the more difficult issues could be the unhappy convergence of the ratification debate in the U.S. Senate and the end of the mandate for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. The Clinton administration policy has been that U.S. forces will leave Bosnia at the end of SFOR's mandate in June 1998, and the major European powers say that, if the United States leaves, they will follow. Many members of Congress would like to hold the administration to its word, while President Clinton now seems to leave open the possibility that some U.S. forces will stay after June 1998. In fact, if it is decided that NATO should continue to manage the post-SFOR operation, the technical coherence of that operation would require that some U.S. forces remain in Bosnia, and not just "over the horizon."

Many members of Congress who believe that some external military presence will be required in

Bosnia beyond June 1998 think that the European allies should demonstrate that they are willing and able to assume more responsibility for security in Europe by taking over post-SFOR military operations. Most European governments, however, believe that any follow-on to SFOR should remain a NATO operation and are reluctant to stay in Bosnia without a clear and present U.S. commitment. Given the uncertain future for Bosnia, the Europeans fear they might be blamed for the failure to implement Dayton and perhaps even face U.S. criticism from the sidelines for the outcome.

Under these circumstances, a trans-Atlantic debate about who will carry future burdens of peace implementation in Bosnia could be developing just as the Senate is considering the question of NATO enlargement.

#### **NATO-RUSSIA**

In addition, Russia's relationship to NATO will likely be debated. Some senators are concerned that NATO enlargement might strengthen the hand of communists and nationalists in Russia and set back the process of reform there. Others are worried that, in order to mitigate Russian opposition to enlargement, the NATO countries might give Russia too much influence over future NATO decisions. The Clinton administration will be called on to demonstrate that U.S. and NATO policies are striking an effective balance between these extremes.

#### **QUALIFICATIONS OF THE CANDIDATES**

Senators clearly want to be reassured that the three candidates are doing all within their power to strengthen their democracies and make serious contributions to NATO's missions. Shortcomings in these areas will be noted, but there is likely to be a large reservoir of goodwill toward the efforts that these three countries have already made to reform their political systems and reorient their defense efforts. It may be ironic, but debate on the applicants' credentials may be less important than broader questions about the quality of the alliance and relative U.S. and European roles in it.

## **STRATEGIC ISSUES**

All of these questions will be debated within the context of bigger issues. Does NATO enlargement increase or decrease the chance that the United States will become involved in a future European conflict? What are the new purposes of NATO, now that the Soviet threat is gone? What would Senate rejection or acceptance of NATO

enlargement say to Europe and the rest of the world about the role that the United States intends to play in the post-Cold War world? Just as the decision to ratify the Treaty of Washington in 1949 helped structure U.S. roles and commitments for the next five decades, this debate may be one of the key elements shaping U.S. foreign policy for many years to come. ●

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## HOW U.S. SENATORS VIEW NATO ENLARGEMENT

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*There is an effort in the U.S. Congress to frame the debate on NATO enlargement in a way that is understandable to constituents. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have important roles in the decision-making process. Spending bills originate in the House; therefore the House must approve any U.S. appropriations that are required to support NATO enlargement. But for the ratification process to conclude successfully, two-thirds of the members of the Senate must approve the proposal to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. Following are excerpts of remarks by senators who participated in the first series of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on NATO enlargement, during which Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified on October 7.*

**SENATOR WILLIAM ROTH  
(REPUBLICAN, DELAWARE)**

I come...before your committee not only as a colleague committed to sustaining and strengthening the trans-Atlantic alliance, but as president of the North Atlantic Assembly as well as co-chairman of the Senate NATO Observer Group.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), representing over 40 political parties from the 16 NATO nations, has given more serious and consistent study to the future of NATO than any other trans-Atlantic organization. The Senate NATO Observer Group, organized just last May by Senators (Trent) Lott and (Thomas) Daschle, has already held more than a dozen meetings to examine the challenges and promise of enlargement.

My association with both the NAA and the Observer Group leave me firmly convinced that enlargement is not only necessary and important to the alliance, but to the United States as well. Will enlargement be easy? Few things this important are easy. But will it be worth it? Absolutely. [Let] me explain why.

As a leader of the North Atlantic Assembly, I was in Berlin shortly after the wall came down, meeting with many of the young democratic leaders who were emerging in Central Europe. On

that occasion I was struck by two oddly opposing insights. First, that the Cold War was over, democracy had indeed prevailed. My second thought, however, was that the move towards democracy alone would not guarantee peace and stability on the European continent.

Having served in World War II, I was painfully aware of just how important peace and stability in Europe are to the United States of America. As I see it...NATO enlargement is an opportunity unprecedented in world history. For the first time we have the chance to be proactive in shaping a strategic landscape that will contribute to peace and stability in Europe. We are not responding to aggression or disaster, but we are building a foundation for a secure future in a region of vital interest to the United States.

Four significant arguments make it clear why NATO enlargement is in America's best interest. First, a wider alliance is a stronger, more capable alliance. A proposal to grant NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will add three democracies to the alliance that have demonstrated their commitment to the values and interests shared by NATO members: human rights, equal justice under the law, and free markets.

Each of these nations has a growing economy and a military under civilian control. It's important to

note that each also contributed forces to Operation Desert Storm, as well as our peacekeeping missions in Haiti and Bosnia. In that NATO is first and foremost a military alliance, the admission of these three democracies will enable the alliance to better fulfill its core mission of collective defense as these nations will add another 300,000 troops to NATO.

Second, NATO enlargement will eliminate the zone of instability that now exists in Europe. Throughout its history Europe has been a landscape of many insecure small powers, a few imperialistic great powers, and too many nationalistic defense policies, each creating friction with the other. Three times in this century these dynamics have pulled America into wars on the European continent....

NATO enlargement is the surest means of doing for Central and Eastern Europe what American leadership through the alliance has done so well for Western Europe. This includes promoting and institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination, and communication. In this way NATO enlargement is not an act of altruism but one of self-interest.

Third, keeping the above argument in mind, it follows that the costs of enlargement are insignificant compared to the cost of remaining static. Should NATO fail to follow through on the commitments made in Madrid, the alliance would be denying what it has stood for and defended throughout the Cold War. Why? Because NATO is much more than a military alliance. It is also a community of values. Enlargement is not only a strategic opportunity, it is a moral imperative.

We cannot ignore the valid aspirations of European democracies who seek to become contributing members of our community. Failure to expand must be considered in terms of what it will cost as disillusionment replaces hope in Central Europe, as nationalism, which enjoyed a renaissance following World War II, fills the security vacuum in a region that has given birth to two world wars.

Cost must also be considered in terms of the consequences to Russia and its struggle towards democracy. Should Central Europe remain a gray zone of insecurity, such a condition would risk reawakening Moscow's history of imperialism. NATO enlargement is a critical, non-threatening complement to the hand of partnership that the West and NATO have extended to Russia. It ensures a regional context in which a democratic Russia will have the best prospects for a normal, cooperative relationship with its European neighbors.

Fourth and finally, NATO enlargement is fundamental to Europe's evolution to a partner that will more effectively meet global challenges to the trans-Atlantic community. An undivided Europe at peace is a Europe that will be better able to look outward, a Europe better able to join with the United States to address necessary global security concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe, and the time and stress-tested architecture of NATO, will enable the United States to more effectively meet the global challenges to its vital interests at a time when defense resources are increasingly strained.

These arguments make it clear that America's best chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe, our best chance of staying out of war in Europe, our best chance for reinforcing what has been a strong, productive partnership with Europe is to promote a Europe that is whole, free and secure.

What better organization to do this than the North Atlantic alliance, an organization that has kept the peace for more than 50 years and remains unmatched in its potential to meet the security challenges of the future.

**SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN  
(DEMOCRAT, DELAWARE)**

I've stated my support for NATO enlargement many times on the floor of the United States Senate and in private forums, so today I'll only summarize my rationale for this policy.

Europe remains a vital interest of the United States. Other than North America, no other region can match Europe's combination of political, economic, military, and cultural power and significance to the United States. The European Union, for example, has a population one-third larger than ours, and a combined GDP slightly greater than ours. A large percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe. By any geo-political standard, it would be a catastrophe for American interests if instability were to alter the current situation in Europe.

After the Cold War, there are new threats to Europe: ethnic and religious conflicts; one nation crossing the borders of another...international crime and drugs; also, I might note, a possible future threat to Mideast oil supplies. For this reason, enlargement is being combined with a new strategic doctrine and a force posture that provides a more mobile and capable force-projection capability in [the] event of any of those crises. In the 20th century, Europeans have proven incapable, if left to themselves, of settling their differences peacefully. The United States, it seems to me, must continue in leading the new security architecture for that continent for, if we don't, I don't know who will.

In this context, admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO will extend the zone of security to Central Europe in a way that if left undone will leave a gray zone and insecurity in that region. The question, I would emphasize, is not [whether to] enlarge NATO or remain the same. The status quo, Madam Secretary, in my view is not an option. If we were not to enlarge, the countries between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves, creating bilateral or multilateral alliances as they did in the '30s, with, I predict, similar results.

There is also a powerful moral argument for enlargement: Redeeming our pledge to former captive nations to rejoin the West, both NATO and the EU when I say "the West," because the Europeans, I think, have to step up to that ball as well. When they're fully qualified to join both,

their security will be fully secured. This fall's final accession talks between NATO and each of the three candidate countries — Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary — will reveal whether each of them meets the alliance's demanding qualifications, and based on my look at it and my travels, I believe they do.

Enlargement...need not adversely affect our relations with Russia. We must re-double our political economic engagement with that country, in my view, and the NATO-Russian Founding Act of May of 1997 is a significant step in the right direction [and] the Partnership for Peace arrangements are equally as important.

Mr. Chairman, two big issues in my view must be solved before the Senate considers ratification. One is directly related; one not as directly — but they're both important. Bosnia and cost-sharing. If Bosnia is a prototypical European crisis of the 21st century, then in the coming weeks, and I mean weeks, the United States and its NATO allies had better come up with a workable post-SFOR (Bosnia Stabilization Force) scenario.

Similarly, while the United States must continue to exercise its leadership role in NATO, our European and Canadian alliance partners must agree, as you indicated, to step up to the plate and bear their fair share of enlargement costs.

The definitive NATO study on cost will come out in December. In anticipation of the report, this committee will hold its third hearing on NATO enlargement on October 22nd. We'll examine the cost and burdensharing items, so I'll not speak much to those today.

I believe that admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO — if they meet the qualifications, which they appear to — will be in the best security interest of the United States of America. I believe to do otherwise would extend a zone of instability, rather than stability.

On the one hand, the only thing that seems to be carrying the momentum right now in the minds of

many colleagues and the American people is the moral imperative; and that is that Poland, and particularly Hungary and the Czech Republic, were left behind the curtain. The curtain is up, now is the time to let them come...West from the East. But there is very little...consensus about why this is in the vital interest of the United States to do so. Very few people believe that adding — as brave and as valiant as they may be — the Polish army and the Czech army and the Hungarian army — are any more likely to make them sleep more safely in Peoria than they sleep today.

Right now...if you asked the American people do they think there's a need for NATO, do they like spending \$120,000 million a year...I suspect you'd find them to say the same thing I hear from my colleagues: Why can't Europe do this? Why not leave well enough alone? If we expand, the alliance will lose its vitality — as one of the senior colleagues on the Armed Services Committee said in a debate I recently had with him to this audience: It ain't broke, so don't fix it. If you expand it, what you're going to do is you're going to diminish consensus. We have a hard enough time getting...16 nations now to agree; expand it by three or more, it's going to even be more difficult to have consensus. You're going to do what was done 300 years ago in Poland when the princes got together and each had a veto; you're going to allow it to crumble.

These are the arguments that I keep hearing. But at its root, it's this argument: "Look, Europe," as one of our colleagues says, "of the six largest armies in the world, five are in Asia. Our economic future lies in Asia. We have a disproportionate allocation of our resources in Europe. Why are we doing this?"

And it comes down, in my view, to the need to answer the following question...: Why cannot the Europeans take care of themselves? Their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is larger than ours. Their population is larger than ours. And as my father said in a different context to me in discussion, not since the Roman army invaded Europe, quelled the pagans, has there been an occupying army that's stayed in place as long as we have been required to stay in place in Europe. Why?

I believe you and the president in particular are going to have to carry that argument to the people, in explanation of that question. Why can Europe not do this themselves? Why do we have to be involved?

**SENATOR JOHN WARNER  
(REPUBLICAN, VIRGINIA)**

I happen to be a very firm skeptic of this program.

First, a quick answer to — [what] if Russia is admitted: I suggest that that would be the end of NATO, because one of the primary missions of NATO would no longer exist. It would be the end because when I joined the Senate 19 years ago, for the first five years this senior group up here led the defense against withdrawing from NATO, pulling our troops back, predicated both on an economic argument and other arguments....

But my concern...goes to the other threat that faces all of the new nations that are looking towards admission, and that is they're fighting fairly today and peaceably for economic survival, and by conferring a NATO status on the three, it puts the other three (Romania, Slovenia, the Baltics), in my humble judgment, at a severe disadvantage, in two ways.

First, they (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) can put in their advertisements for foreign capital, "Come invest here, because you'll be more secure, because NATO is here" — not unlike the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation when you deposit in your bank.

Secondly, these nations will not have to mount their own defenses, because they'll be a part of NATO. And I have discussed this with the ambassadors and the foreign ministers and the defense ministers of these countries that readily admit our cost to build that level of defense, we think, and security that is necessary will be one-third or perhaps one-half of what the nations that are not admitted will have to cough up. All of this to me indicates that you'll begin to breed dissension. And as we know today, part of the

security of the world, the growing part of it that is threatened [is being threatened by] ethnic strife, border strife, religious strife. And you superimpose on their struggle today for economic survival, economic competition, NATO status and less cost for their defense, and I think you're sowing the seeds of strife between these countries.

**SENATOR PAUL WELLSTONE  
(DEMOCRAT, MINNESOTA)**

On this question (of NATO expansion), I'm really quite undecided.

This is what I don't quite understand: If we're talking about the importance of improving the economies and democratization of countries like Hungary and the Czech Republic and Poland, there's the European Union. I don't know how a military alliance really meets those concerns....The question is where are we heading? I mean we have to look to the future. If, for example, we're saying that this isn't the end, that others, the Baltic countries and Ukraine are welcome, what then would be the consequences within Russia?

And I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who's trying to sort through these issues, to get closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a senator. You said that if countries meet these criteria, democratic criteria, they're welcome. If Russia meets these criteria, would it be welcome in NATO?

Why would we be trying to expand a military alliance which we built vis-a-vis a Soviet Union that doesn't exist any longer? It's not so much a question of our policy being governed necessarily by "paranoia in Russia," but it has more to do with, as we look to the future, whether or not this could in fact invite the very instability that would be so dangerous to the world that we live in. It's a very legitimate, important concern that I think we'll have more debate on.

So [there is a] range of questions: Why are we doing this? What is the military threat? How does

the military alliance expand the economy and democracy? What are the consequences within Russia? Isn't it true that the democratic forces in Russia are the most opposed? And finally, would Russia be eligible to join an expanded NATO?

On cost, I think that's a big issue in our country. I think we all agree that if, in fact, some of the estimates of cost severely underestimate what we're going to be faced with, or the European countries aren't going to be paying, then that's going to become, I think, a big concern in our country.

**SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR  
(REPUBLICAN, INDIANA)**

In my judgment, the NATO enlargement debate has thus far largely ignored the central question of NATO's basic purpose. The Senate's ratification debate over new alliance members should start with that question....

Many of us within the Congress and the administration have been working hard to ensure ratification of the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic — perhaps too busy to define NATO's purpose. But issues associated with purpose and burdensharing will come up in the ratification proceedings. The answers will be key to the ratification, but also for the future of NATO.

First, the absence of a clearly defined and understood purpose can complicate the implementation of enlargement by making it appear as if the alliance's exclusive mission is to defend its members against some future, yet ill-defined threat from the East. While not insignificant, such a preoccupation could, in turn, focus allied militaries on the wrong problem, particularly if major strategic threats to the United States and its allies are elsewhere.

Second, the act of enlargement is becoming confused with the alliance's reason for existing. And the issue of future additional members could either cause further delay in addressing NATO's core purpose, or be delayed by inadequate definition of the alliance's core missions.

Third, the alliance force planning, goals, and programs must be based on a military strategy, and which in turn must be shaped by a strategic purpose. Adequate defense spending and the modernization and restructuring of outdated forces will not occur in the absence of strategic purpose.

Fourth, the United States' strategy and technology are driven by global priorities, while European forces are focused on territorial defense and thus are largely irrelevant to U.S. priorities. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review does not substantially take account of NATO, Europe, or the allies in U.S. global strategy and requirement. In short, to judge by the QDR, America's main alliance is not confronting the main security problems of the United States. Despite alliance emphasis on defense of its members' territory under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and the kinds of peace operations and crisis management under Article 4, NATO is in need of strategic direction. This should be accomplished before or in parallel with further decisions about forces, command, structure, and membership.

To oversimplify, I believe there are at least two strategic alternatives that could drive the alliance's core purpose. The first is for NATO to be the guarantor of European security; and thus, NATO's mission is identified with a European mission and should dovetail with Europe's danger.

The second is for NATO to serve as the vehicle by which Americans and Europeans protect their common interests — wherever challenged. While it subsumes the first, it also suggests that the Atlantic alliance can and should confront the rising threats to the interests of members beyond Europe.

Geography is the chief criterion of the first strategy; interests are what matter in the second.....

Where does the administration stand on the definition of our strategic alternatives, and what strategic direction or rationale will it promote within the alliance? ●

## NATO'S IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

*By Joshua Muravchik  
Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute*

*Noting that NATO's members enjoy freedom, prosperity, and security, Muravchik contends that NATO is "in a position to set norms that can have a deep impact" on new members and on other nations that seek membership. "Although NATO's mutual defense obligations lie at the heart of the alliance and give it its gravitas," he says, "this psychological impact on the political and economic evolution of Europe may turn out to be its most important function." Muravchik is resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and also serves as an adjunct scholar at the Washington Institute on Near East Policy and adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics. He is a member of the editorial boards of "World Affairs," the "Journal of Democracy," and "Orbis."*

When the U.S. Senate in 1949 ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, which brought NATO into being, the debate focused largely on the military weakness of America's prospective allies.

The European states had hardly begun to recover from the devastation of World War Two. They had little to contribute to the task of mutual defense unless the United States undertook the expense of rearming them, which many senators — budget conscious then, as today — were loath to assume. These worries were answered most effectively by the renowned military strategist Bernard Brodie in an article that bears striking relevance to the debate today about expanding NATO.

Writing in the December 1949 issue of the "Yale Review," Brodie acknowledged that "in the short term the North Atlantic Pact represents a military and resource liability to us. There is at present no strength in Western Europe at all capable of coping with Soviet armies." From a military point of view, he conceded, "there was a certain generous abandon about the way we invited nations into the fold, with little regard for their size or power or condition of exposure." Nonetheless he judged the pact to be a good deal for the United States because "military considerations were of secondary moment."

How could this be? The pact was inspired by the threat of Soviet aggression. Brodie took this threat seriously, but he argued that "the non-military forms of aggression," in other words, subversion, were the most likely means by which the Soviet empire could be expanded into Western Europe. The key to preventing Soviet penetration, in whatever form, was the reconstruction of Western European societies. "Insofar as the pact assists and stimulates the recovery of Europe," said Brodie, Soviet machinations "will...be deprived of menace." Thus, he argued, "the value to the United States of the pact was political rather than military...since only by the promise of security inherent in it could the Western European states make the efforts necessary to their social, political, and economic salvation."

Brodie's analysis was prescient. Under the umbrella of NATO, Western European economies were built anew, as were the organs of civil society and stable political parties. NATO was of course only one factor contributing to Europe's economic rebirth; the Marshall Plan was a more direct one. Over the course of four years, the United States donated some \$13 billion in aid to the project to foster post-World War II economic recovery in certain European countries. The U.S. contribution would be equivalent to \$88 billion today. Yet substantial as this sum was, most economic

historians believe that its direct returns were less important than its psychological impact. Together, the hope engendered by the Marshall Plan and the security provided by NATO created a climate that energized Europeans to work, save, and invest until they had created for themselves a prosperity they had never enjoyed before.

America gave much to Europe both in economic aid and in military protection, but it also received a lot in return, although sometimes this point was missed by Americans. As Europe grew prosperous, some Americans began to see Europe as a competitor rather than as a partner. But this was a narrow view. Although European firms did compete with U.S. firms, Europe's renewed affluence provided markets, goods, and capital that fed America's own continued economic growth.

Europe's economic recovery came to be referred to as a "miracle," but its political recovery was even more remarkable. Today, most Americans, and perhaps most Europeans, take democracy in Western Europe for granted. But before World War Two, democracy had been a fragile flower on the European continent. In most countries it had been clearly established either shortly before or after the First World War, and then had given way to dictatorship in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s. As a result, knowledgeable observers developed deep misgivings about the prospects for democracy outside the ambit of Anglo-Saxon culture. These misgivings sounded a lot like those one hears today about democracy in the developing world. Perhaps these doubts are just as unfounded today as those were then.

The great historian Arnold Toynbee wrote in the 1930s that Italy's repudiation of "democracy (in our conventional use of the term) has made it an open question whether this political plant can really strike permanent root anywhere except in its native soil." A decade later, novelist and academician Waldo Frank wrote in "Foreign Affairs" that "the threat [to democracy] will outlast Hitler, since fascism itself is a mere end-product of deep-grained anti-democratic forces within the very texture of modern European thought." And,

in 1952, as the allied occupation of Germany came to a close, the eminent political scientist Heinz Eulau revisited his homeland and reported pessimistically: "In so many ways — despite the changed setting and the changed cast — the Bonn Republic seems like a second performance of Weimar....German politics is...grounded not on democratic experience but on a deep emotionalism."

All such fears were confounded. In contrast to the period after World War One, in the decades since World War Two, democracy's roots have grown ever deeper throughout Western Europe. Many factors contributed to political success, and the strong influence of NATO was not the least among these.

The security NATO afforded was itself one factor, since fear of foreign threats often furnishes a pretext for power grabs by would-be dictators. In addition, NATO created a sense of community among the North Atlantic states within which former bitter enemies became partners. NATO was not the only force drawing together the states of the North Atlantic. There was trade and tourism, and there were other institutions. But the pledge of mutual defense, the commitment to die for one another, formed the core of the relationship.

This relationship was motivated in part by common fears but also by a common democratic ethos. As the opening words of the North Atlantic treaty put it: "The parties...are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."

The alliance also provided a framework that contributed to the socialization of the military leaders of the post-World War Two era. This included the inculcation of a strong belief in civilian supremacy. Whereas during the 1920s and 1930s the downfall of democracy in many European countries came at the hands of military officers, such episodes have been rare in NATO countries. The most dramatic exception was in

Greece where a military coup in 1967 obliterated democracy for seven years. In Turkey, the military ousted democratically-chosen governments on several occasions, each time returning control to civilian hands within a year or so. These instances show that NATO's influence in behalf of civilian rule has not been all-powerful, but given the fissures in the Greek and Turkish bodies politic, it seems fair to ask whether the derogations from democracy in those countries might not have lasted much longer had they not been embedded in NATO.

Portugal presents a similarly ambiguous history. Despite its corporatist dictatorship, it was included as an original NATO member because of the perceived strategic importance of the Azores. Twenty-five years later its dictatorship was overthrown and democracy was restored, in a chain of events in which military officers and Portugal's NATO allies played pivotal roles.

Today, the enlargement of NATO is often portrayed as the extension of a security umbrella to Central Europe. But just as Brodie foresaw with the original group of NATO members, security may be less a matter of defense against military

threats than of assuring stability by reinforcing democratic institutions and providing the confidence conducive to economic growth.

Military officers in the states admitted to NATO, and even those which are only in the Partnership for Peace, will receive a good part of their training from American and West European counterparts. With it they will imbibe a strong message of civilian control. Nor is it only among military people that this influence will be felt. Joining NATO means joining the West, to which democratic values are even more integral than McDonald's and MTV.

NATO is a prestigious club. Its members enjoy what everyone wants: freedom, prosperity, and security. As such, it is in a position to set norms that can have a deep impact on new members and on other states aspiring to membership or even those who just want warm relations with the club's members. Although NATO's mutual defense obligations lie at the heart of the alliance and give it its gravitas, this psychological impact on the political and economic evolution of Europe may turn out to be its most important function. ●

## WHAT THE POLLS SAY: U.S. PUBLIC'S ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT

*By Alvin Richman, Senior Research Specialist  
Office of Research and Media Reaction, U.S. Information Agency*

Recent polls show that a small majority of Americans support enlarging NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. However, opinions on NATO enlargement could shift with further debate, since only a fifth of the public claims to be closely following news about this issue.

Following are other key findings:

- Americans divide most sharply by education level on the subject of NATO enlargement: About three-fourths of college graduates approve of it, contrasted to slightly more than half of those having no college education. Thus far, there has been little difference between Democrats and Republicans on the question of NATO expansion.
- Three-fourths of U.S. “opinion leaders” (average for ten leadership groups) approve of NATO expansion.
- The argument that NATO is needed to deter Russia is not as persuasive to Americans as the argument that an enlarged, more inclusive NATO will deal more effectively with various global threats against, and disputes among, NATO members.

### **ONE-FIFTH OF U.S. PUBLIC NOW PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION**

Pew Research Center polls since last January have repeatedly found that only about a fifth of the U.S. public is closely following news reports about enlarging NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In August, six percent said they were following this issue “very closely” and 16 percent said “fairly closely.” Nearly four-fifths said

they were following it “not too closely” (31 percent) or “not at all closely” (46 percent).

NATO enlargement drew less attention than any of eight other news stories tested in August by the Pew Research Center: Three-fifths of the respondents said they were “closely” following news stories about the exploration of the planet Mars (58 percent “very” or “fairly closely”), and two-fifths or more said they were similarly attentive to the debate about the federal budget (48 percent), the “reunification of Hong Kong and China” (48 percent), and the most recent suicide bombing in Jerusalem (40 percent).

### **RECENT POLLS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT**

Two recent polls asked different questions about NATO enlargement, but obtained comparable majorities supporting the idea. The Pew Research Center, in a survey conducted September 4-11, asked, “Generally do you approve or disapprove of expanding NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.” Sixty-three percent approved, and 18 percent disapproved.

Gallup/USA Today, in a poll conducted August 22-25, mentioned the collective defense obligations of NATO members and asked specifically about admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. Support for admitting these countries ranged from about one-half for the Czech Republic (51 percent in favor versus 31 against) to nearly two-thirds for admitting Poland (64 percent in favor versus 19 percent against). Support for admitting Hungary was 58 percent in favor versus 22 percent opposed.

*Population Groups* — The Pew Research Center and Gallup/USA Today polls found Americans

differ most sharply by education level on the issue of NATO enlargement: Three-fourths of college graduates polled by the Pew Research Center approve of enlarging NATO (77 percent in favor versus 12 percent against), contrasted to 57 percent in support of NATO enlargement among those surveyed with no college education. Both the Pew Research Center and Gallup/USA Today polls found little difference between Democrats and Republicans on the question of support for NATO enlargement.

*U.S. Opinion Leaders* — The Pew Research Center, in a summer 1997 survey, posed the same question on NATO enlargement to a sample made up of ten different groups of “American influentials.” They included officials in local and state government as well as leaders in the private sector representing business, foreign policy, science, engineering, media, religious, and other organizations. On the average, 76 percent approved and 21 percent disapproved of enlarging NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. On a separate question, 66 percent of the opinion leaders approved and 26 percent disapproved of “a second round” of NATO enlargement in the future.

#### **ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST NATO ENLARGEMENT**

Earlier polls have shown that Americans’ support for NATO comes less from the perception of an external (Soviet/Russian) threat than from a desire to maintain close U.S.-European ties. A survey taken in September 1996 by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) presented a number of arguments for and against enlarging NATO and asked respondents whether each argument was “convincing” or “unconvincing.”

The most persuasive arguments favoring NATO enlargement were those that emphasized a highly inclusive U.S.-European security structure.

Seventy-seven percent of the public — the greatest consensus achieved on any of the arguments in the survey — found the following argument “convincing”: “It is better to include Eastern European countries in NATO rather than exclude them because peace is more likely if we all communicate and work together.” About two-thirds of the public found “convincing” the argument that NATO enlargement would create an alliance that would be in a “better position to resolve conflicts” between Eastern European countries that are included in NATO. The most popular argument against NATO enlargement (62 percent found it “convincing”) also was based on the theme of inclusiveness. It stated, “Instead of expanding NATO, something new should be developed that includes Russia, rather than treating Russia as an enemy.”

Fifty-seven percent of respondents found “convincing” the argument that NATO enlargement would increase the U.S. “burden” by “increasing the number of countries the U.S. will have to defend.” However, 61 percent of respondents found “convincing” the argument that NATO enlargement would reduce the U.S. “burden” by “increasing the number of countries that can help in NATO missions.”

The least persuasive arguments — either favoring or opposing NATO enlargement — were those that focused on Russia. Fewer than half of the respondents (45 percent) rated as “convincing” the argument that enlarging NATO would help deter Russia from threatening Eastern European countries brought into NATO. At the same time, fewer than half (41 percent) rated as “convincing” the argument that NATO enlargement would unnecessarily provoke Russia and “revive Cold War tensions.” And only 35 percent rated as “convincing” the argument that neither the existing NATO nor an enlarged NATO is needed because “Russia does not pose a significant threat now.” ©

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Barry, Charles L. CREATING A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (Joint Force Quarterly, no. 15, Spring 1997, pp. 62-69)

The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), a concept for a unified European military, is “an initiative to encourage,” says retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Barry. However, ESDI still has many obstacles to overcome to prove that it is capable and dependable, he says. “The United States wants Europe to begin making military responses to crises,” he contends, and a successful ESDI could mean that Europe would be able to assume an active role with the United States in meeting crises outside Europe.

Cragg, Anthony. INTERNAL ADAPTATION: RESHAPING NATO FOR THE CHALLENGES OF TOMORROW (NATO Review, vol. 45, no. 4, July/August 1997, pp. 30-35)

NATO’S new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management, together with the opportunity to build a new security architecture in Europe, have made it necessary to change the alliance’s structure, says Cragg, NATO’s assistant secretary general for defense planning and operations. He contends the alliance is “now well placed to respond fully and effectively to the challenges of the new century.”

Kitfield, James. A LARGER NATO MEANS BIGGER HEADACHES? (National Journal, no. 29, July 19, 1997, pp. 1467-1469)

Kitfield suggests that issues related to defense burdensharing in the NATO enlargement debate “are already shaping up as possible obstacles to Senate approval next year.” The author contends that extending NATO eastward will fill an existing strategic vacuum and reinforce newly emerged democracies in Central Europe. Kitfield also predicts that the alliance may well be preoccupied for years with disagreements about NATO’s future growth.

Pipes, Richard. IS RUSSIA STILL AN ENEMY? (Foreign Affairs, vol.76, no.5, September/October, 1997, pp. 65-78)

Western leaders should consider whether extending NATO to Eastern Europe is worth alienating the majority of politically active Russians, who see the move as permanently excluding their country from Europe, says the author, who is Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University. The “ambiguity” of a “gray zone” between Russia and the present members of NATO, he says, would actually help assure Russia that even if it is not politically and militarily part of Europe, it is also not categorically excluded. Pipes warns that “immense patience and empathy” are required in dealing with Russia’s halting progress toward democracy, and that “failure to display them only helps anti-Western forces.”

Rose, Richard. TEDDY BEARS: THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ARE IN NO MOOD FOR CONFLICT, WHICH OUGHT TO EASE NATO EXPANSION (National Review, vol. 49, no. 16, September 1, 1997, pp. 44-45)

The results of a public opinion survey of Russians support the view that they want peace, says Rose. He contends that, at this juncture, the Russian people are more concerned with domestic problems than with their current role in the international arena. “The real threats to the security of Russians are at home,” he says. “Crime on the street and the wholesale embezzlement of assets” by high-ranking public officials and businessmen have demoralized Russians, Rose writes. ◎

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*The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the home page of the U.S. Information Service:*  
<http://www.usia.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html>

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Allied Forces Southern Europe  
<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/>

Cato Handbook for Congress: NATO Expansion  
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-43.html>

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Defence & Security Links  
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